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COY V. IOWA: RECONCILING A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO CONFRONTATION WITH A CHILD-
WITNESS' INTEREST IN AVOIDING
UNDUE PSYCHOLOGICAL
TRAUMA
I. INTRODUCTION
A stranger sexually molested a twelve year-old child. The prosecutor
did not learn of the incident until the child turned seventeen-when the
child finally revealed the crime. The court dismissed the case on the basis
of a psychiatric evaluation that the child could not testify without exper-
iencing a total emotional breakdown. The child had dealt with the trau-
matic incident by trying to forget-to force her to remember the incident
would have been devastating.
A friend of a seven year-old boy sexually abused him. When the boy
spoke to the prosecuting attorney, the boy spoke freely and articulately.
However, when testifying before the grand jury, the presence of many peo-
ple made the boy hesitant, forgetful, and inconsistent in his testimony.
A father was charged with sexually abusing his daughter. The child
found it difficult to talk about the molestation, and refused to discuss the
facts with anyone except the prosecuting attorney. Consequently, the court
dismissed the complaint because the necessary facts could not be presented
to a grand jury.
A child told a psychiatrist offrequent incidents of sexual abuse by her
stepfather beginning when she was only three years old. Although she told
the psychiatrist she would be able to testify in open court and face her
stepfather, she feared him because he had threatened to kill her if she
revealed his activities. She was therefore hesitant about testifying in court. 1
Although children may fear testifying in court, the sixth amendment
Confrontation Clause guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."2 The Confrontation Clause grants all criminal defendants
the right to challenge their accusers in open court and engage in mean-
ingful cross-examination.3 Originally, the right of confrontation sought
1. In State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 413, 484 A.2d 1330, 1332-33 (1984), the
court discussed these four case histories.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
3. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Arenson, The Confrontation Clause: Where Will
the Supreme Court Take Us?, 12 S.U.L. REV. 15, 18 (1985).
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to prevent the practice of trying defendants on evidence that consisted
solely of reading depositions, confessions of accomplices, or ex parte affi-
davits that effectively deprived defendants of the opportunity to chal-
lenge their accusers in a face-to-face encounter before a jury.
As illustrated by the above excerpts, sending a child-victim com-
plaining of sexual abuse through the rigors of testifying before an adult-
oriented court system may well impede the discovery of truth and unnec-
essarily traumatize the child. Ironically, the very factors that encourage
adults to testify truthfully may intimidate children-the courtroom at-
mosphere itself may frighten the child.' Some children become so trau-
matized from intense questioning or from fears of having to face the
defendant in the courtroom that they become distraught or physically
ill.6 The defendant, aware that he may elicit such a reaction, may use his
confrontation right solely to intimidate the witness.7 Thus, actual face-
to-face confrontation could prove less reliable.'
Moreover, some defense attorneys use ethically and professionally
questionable methods to cross-examine a child that they would not use to
question an adult.9 The state cannot press charges when the children
refuse to testify in court."0 The defendant often goes free because the
evidence proves insufficient to convict without the child's testimony.'"
Therefore, the system's attempt to prosecute a child-abuser further
abuses the child.
Sexual abuse of children is a major problem in our society,12 and its
elimination demands modification of the technical requirements of con-
frontation at trial to accommodate child-victims.13 Accordingly, many
4. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
5. Wixom, Videotaping the Testimony of an Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the
Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 3 UTAH L. REV.
461, 464 (1986).
6. MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 149 (1985).
7. Mahady-Smith, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of
Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REv. 721, 742 (1985); Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 73 (1981).
8. Mahady-Smith, supra note 7, at 742; Melton, supra note 7, at 76.
9. Bowes, Libai's Child Courtroom: Is it Constitutional?, 7 J. Juv. L. 31, 34 (1983). For
example, the attorney may instruct the child to step down in front of the jury and show the
position she had to take while being molested. Id. See also Berliner, The Child Witness: The
Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 167, 174 (1985).
10. Mahady-Smith, supra note 7, at 731.
11. Libai, The Protection of the Child-Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1009 (1969); Mahady-Smith, supra note 7, at 731; Wixom,
supra note 5, at 465.
12. Mahady-Smith, supra note 7, at 728.
13. Id. at 732; Wixom, supra note 5, at 465-66. In Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa. 57,
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states have enacted special trial procedures to solve this problem.14 Em-
ploying these special procedures eases the testifying process for the child,
yet allows recognition of the defendant's confrontation right. The court
permits the child to testify in another room via one-way or two-way
closed circuit television, or by videotaping the child's testimony. 15 Nu-
merous experts and scholars have concluded that the use of such protec-
tive courtroom procedures enhances the reliability of the child's
testimony.16 However, to avoid violating the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right, any special trial procedure designed to protect child-wit-
nesses must not substantially interfere with the defendant's opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses.
This Note examines the constitutional issues arising from the con-
flict between a defendant's right to confront his adverse witnesses, and a
child's interest in testifying against the defendant without experiencing
emotional distress. Specifically, this Note addresses the United States
Supreme Court decision of Coy v. Iowa 17 and discusses why limits on a
defendant's confrontation right may be constitutional. As the above ex-
cerpts illustrate, the friction between a child-victim's interest in testifying
in court free from mental and physical harm and a defendant's constitu-
tional right to confront the witnesses against him poses a threat to suc-
cessful prosecution of child molesters.18 While perfect resolution of these
competing interests is impossible, this Note will argue that providing a
defendant with a slightly modified confrontation right will still guarantee
the defendant a fair trial, while minimizing unnecessary emotional
trauma to the child.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The origins of the sixth amendment Confrontation Clause can be
364 A.2d 902 (1976), the court excluded spectators from the defendant's trial because the
court feared that the presence of spectators would further traumatize the child. Id. at 63, 364
A.2d at 907. The court held the exclusion did not violate the defendant's right to a public trial.
Id. at 64, 364 A.2d at 908.
14. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-
129 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Bums 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (Supp.
1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 1205 (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1988); S.
D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (Supp. 1988);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
15. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989). q
16. See Note, Proving Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony in Court by
the Victim, 15 U. MiCH. J.L. REF., 131, 137 (1981).
17. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
18. See Avery, The Child Abuse Witness; Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM.
JusT. J. 1, 3-5 (1983); Mahady-Smith, supra note 7, at 728-32, 742-43; Wixom, supra note 5, at
461-62.
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traced to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.19 Raleigh was accused
of high treason. 20 The principal evidence to support Raleigh's conviction
consisted of an alleged co-conspirator's testimony that Raleigh plotted to
seize the throne.2" However, the witness later retracted the statement,
and Raleigh believed that the witness would testify in his favor.22 Never-
theless, the government refused to allow Raleigh to call the witness, and
consequently used the witness' written statement to convict Raleigh.23
The public outrage resulting from Raleigh's ex parte trial, combined with
evolving concerns for individual liberty, led the English to make de-
mands for individual rights.24
Carrying this concern to the New World, the colonists drafted con-
stitutions guaranteeing citizens individual rights, including protection for
criminal defendants like Raleigh.25 The United States Constitution codi-
fied limitations on federal governmental power in the Bill of Rights.26
The sixth amendment aspires to ensure protection of individual dignity
during criminal prosecutions, thereby protecting defendants from ex
parte trials like Raleigh's.27
Over the years, courts and commentators have come to find certain
corollary rights flowing from the right to confrontation.2" For instance,
19. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 n.16 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("It has been
suggested that the constitutional provision is based on a common-law principle that originated
in a reaction to abuses at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.") (citing F. HELLER, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT 104 (1951)).
However, one commentator believes that Raleigh's trial did not inspire the sixth amend-
ment. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972). Graham states that the custom of referring to
Raleigh's trial as the origin of the sixth amendment right "represents ... a convenient but
highly romantic myth." Id. at 100 n.4. By contrast, Graham believes that the creation of the
sixth amendment resulted from the form of trials in the vice-admiralty courts, rather than
Raleigh's trial or the abuses committed by the Star Chamber. Id. at 104 n.23.
20. See Graham, supra note 19, at 99-100.
21. Id. at 100.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 100-01.
24. See E. BARRETT & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 17
(1985).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 17-19.
27. The sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartialjury of the State, and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. See Graham, supra note 9, at 102.
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the right to confrontation requires the prosecution to produce the com-
plaining witness in open court for the defendant to cross-examine.2 9
Confrontation allows the judge and jury to assess the truth and veracity
of a witness' statement.3" This function works best when the witness tes-
tifies under oath, subject to cross-examination, and appears in front of a
jury who can observe the witness' demeanor during testimony.3'
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant in Coy v. Iowa 32 was accused of sexually accosting
two thirteen year-old girls while they were sleeping in their backyard
tent next door to Coy. 33 The only witnesses against the defendant were
these children. 34 At the defendant's jury trial, the court placed a screen
between the defendant and the two young witnesses pursuant to an Iowa
statute.35 The Iowa statute authorized the witnesses to testify either via
closed-circuit television or behind a screen in the courtroom:
The court may require a party to be confined to an adjacent
room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to see
and hear the child during the child's testimony, but does not
allow the child to see or hear the party. However, if a party is
so confined, the court shall take measures to insure that the
party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall
inform the child that the party can see and hear the child dur-
ing the testimony.36
To enhance the screen's performance, the court dimmed the normal
courtroom lights and focused a panel of bright lights directly at the
screen, which created a "sort of a dramatic emphasis and a potentially
'eerie' effect."' 37 Although the judge and jury could freely observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and the defendant, the screen blocked the de-
fendant completely from the witnesses' line of vision.3' The defendant
29. "A primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-exami-
nation." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); Graham, Indicia of Reliability and
Face-to-face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 19, 65 (1985); Graham, supra note 19, at 100-01.
30. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L.
REv. 557, 578 (1988).
31. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
32. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (988).
33. Id. at 2799. '
34. Id. at 2805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
36. Id.
37. Coy, 108 S.'Ct.'at 2810 (Blackmun, 'J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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vigorously objected to the use of the screening device, arguing that since
the witnesses could not see him, the procedure violated his right to "face-
to-face" confrontation expressly granted by the sixth amendment of the
Constitution.39
The trial court rejected the defendant's constitutional claims. 40 Af-
firming the defendant's conviction, the Iowa Supreme Court held that
since the screen did not impair the defendant's ability to cross-examine
the witnesses, no sixth amendment violation existed.41 The United States
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed the conviction, holding
that use of a protective screen in court violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to face-to-face confrontation.42
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of the Court in Coy v. Iowa,
4 3
relied on several public policy and legal doctrines to invalidate the Iowa
statute' and to hold that the Confrontation Clause strictly guaranteed a
defendant's right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses at trial.4"
However, since only a plurality of the Supreme Court joined Justice
Scalia's absolutist view of the Confrontation Clause, Coy's precedential
value is limited.
Justice Scalia distinguished the sixth amendment right to confront
39. Id. The defendant also argued that the procedure was inherently prejudicial and vio-
lated his fourteenth amendment right to due process. Id. He believed that the procedure
would make him appear guilty and therefore eroded the presumption of innocence. Id. at
2809-10. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to address this issue because it found that
the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was violated. Id. at 2803.
40. Id. at 2799-800. However, the trial court explained to the jury that the screen was a
device used in procedures involving children. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 735 (1986).
41. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (1986).
42. 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988). However, the Supreme Court remanded the case because
the Iowa Supreme Court did not address whether, under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967), the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Coy, 108 S.
Ct. at 2803.
43. Three other members of the Supreme Court-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens-joined Justice Scalia's opinion to reverse the defendant's conviction and remand the
case. Id. at 2799. Justice Brennan joined in the judgment only, and wrote a brief separate
opinion in which he stressed that the screen did not prejudice the defendant's trial. Id. at 2810
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices O'Connor and White wrote an opinion
concurring in the judgment to reverse and remand the case only. Id. at 2803 (O'Connor &
White, J.J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 2805 (Blackmun,
J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy did not take part in the decision. Id. at
2799.
44. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
45. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
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one's accusers from other sixth amendment guarantees.46 He explored
the roots of the confrontation right, finding them to be deeply embedded
in human nature and the American criminal justice system.47 Justice
Scalia found that the essence of the Confrontation Clause's protection
was the guarantee of a face-to-face meeting at trial, based on the plain
meaning of the sixth amendment.48
Determining that the right to a face-to-face meeting lies at the core49
of the Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia held that the right was abso-
lute."o The Constitution guaranteed a defendant this core right even if
face-to-face confrontation caused a child-victim to suffer undue emo-
tional trauma. 1 Justice Scalia did not determine whether any exceptions
to face-to-face confrontation existed, and held the Iowa statutory proce-
dure unconstitutional because the statute denied the defendant the op-
portunity of a face-to-face encounter with the witnesses. 2 As an
interpretivist,"3 Justice Scalia relied on the Framers' original intent and
the Constitution's text to discern the Confrontation Clause's meaning.
As an advocate of judicial restraint, he decided no more of the constitu-
tional question than proved necessary to rule on the case at hand.
46. Id. at 2800-02.
47. Id. at 2801. To illustrate how deeply ingrained the right to confrontation is in Ameri-
can culture, Justice Scalia cited specific examples from history. He referred to Roman law,
which required accusers to meet a defendant face-to-face to allow the defendant the opportu-
nity to defend himself against charges. Id. at 2800. Justice Scalia further noted that England
recognized a form of the right to confrontation even before the right to a jury trial. Id. (citing
Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 384-87
(1959)). Also, Shakespeare defined confrontation through his character Richard II: "'Then all
them to our presence-face-to-face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the ac-
cuser and the accused freely speak.'" W. SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act 1, sc.1 (circa 1600).
Additionally, President Eisenhower stated that if someone accused another of a crime, "he
must come up on front, he cannot hide behind the shadow." Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801 (quoting
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, press release of remarks given to the Anti-Iefamation
League of B'nai B'rith, November 23, 1953, quoted in Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its
History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381 (1959)).
48. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
49. Id. at 2801 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970)).
50. Id. at 2802-03.
51. Id. at 2802.
52. Id. at 2803.
53. An interpretivist limits judicial review to matters expressly covered by the Constitu-
tion or that can be logically deduced from an express constitutional restriction. Karlin, Back
to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U.L. REv. 627, 631-32 (1988). Interpretivists
search for the meaning of concepts in terms of the Framers' intent. Id. Alternatively, a non-
interpretivist does not confine himself to the text of the Constitution, but rather looks to
sources such as American tradition and history, philosophy and contemporary moral theory to
apply the Constitution as a neutral body of law to satisfy modem needs. Id. at 634-35. Non-
interpretivists think in terms of a "living Constitution." Id. at 634.
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1. The difference between the core confrontation right and the right
to cross-examine witnesses
Justice Scalia distinguished the defendant's core sixth amendment
confrontation right at issue in Coy v. Iowa54 from the defendant's other
sixth amendment guarantees, specifically the defendant's right to cross-
examine witnesses and to exclude out-of-court statements.55 He argued
that satisfaction of one did not necessarily satisfy the other.5 6 The right
to a face-to-face encounter at trial, Justice Scalia explained, formed the
core right or essence of the Confrontation Clause, while the rights to
cross-examine witnesses and to exclude out-of-court statements were
rights merely implicit in the Confrontation Clause. 7 The defendant's
confrontation right was not secured simply by allowing the defendant the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and by complying with the evi-
dence rules.5 8 Although the right to cross examine one's accuser may
serve the same purpose as the right to face-to-face confrontation, 9
Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted the Confrontation Clause
using hearsay exceptions' or restrictions on the scope of cross-examina-
tion61 have not adequately defined the core confrontation right. 2
According to Justice Scalia, the clause's "plain meaning" shaped the
core confrontation rights.6" As the Latin root of confrontation means
54. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
55. Id. at 2800.
56. Id. at 2801 n.2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2802.
60. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974).
62. Co.p, 108 S. Ct. at 2800. Justice Scalia stated that most Supreme Court cases focus on
issues not explicit in the Clause such as hearsay and cross-examination because the extent to
which the Clause includes those elements is uncertain since they are not explicitly set forth in
the Clause. Id. Cases which involved debate over whether to imply new rights from the Con-
frontation Clause include: Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (restrictions on scope
of cross-examination); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (admissibility of out-of-court state-
ments); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (restrictions on the scope of cross-examination);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (admissibility of out-of-court statements). Justice Scalia
believed that the controversy over whether the Confrontation Clause included these elements
created litigation concerning the scope of the Clause. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800. However, Jus-
tice Scalia stated that the Confrontation Clause explicitly guaranteed the right to a face-to-face
meeting at trial. Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970)). Justice Scalia
asserted that the Supreme Court had never doubted a defendant's core right to a face-to-face
encounter at trial. Id. Thus, reasoned Scalia, unlike cases involving rights that are implicit in
the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court has not needed to decide issues involving the
core confrontation right since that right is explicit. Id.
63. Id. at 2801.
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"face-to-face," 4 Justice Scalia concluded that the clause's definition ex-
plicitly granted the defendant the right to face an accuser at trial.65 This
"'literal right to confront the witness at the time of trial' . . form[s] 'the
core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.' "66
2. The refusal to balance an absolute constitutional guarantee
Since the Constitution explicitly guaranteed the right to a face-to-
face encounter at trial, Justice Scalia stated that the right was absolute,
and therefore may not be balanced.67 Justice Scalia distinguished con-
trary Supreme Court precedent that balanced the confrontation right
against other important interests.68 He reasoned that the confrontation
rights balanced in those cases did not involve the clause's explicit core
right,6 9 but rather, involved only those confrontation rights merely im-
plicit in the Confrontation Clause.7" Justice Scalia found a significant
difference between claiming that reasonable implications to the confron-
tation right must be balanced against other essential interests, and identi-
fying exceptions to the Confrontation Clause's core meaning.
To demonstrate the importance of the absolute guarantee of a face-
to-face encounter at trial, Justice Scalia's opinion included many refer-
ences to, and quotations from, history to indicate that the public had
always regarded face-to-face confrontation as " 'essential to a fair trial in
criminal prosecution[s].' ,72 While tracing the right back to the begin-
64. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 276 (9th ed. 1988).
65. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
66. Id. at 2801 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
67. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988). However, Scalia did state: "We leave
for another day.., the question whether any exceptions [to the Confrontation Clause] exist."
Id. at 2803.
68. Id. at 2802 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (1987) (defendant's
asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in proceedings other than trial itself
not violated by defendant's exclusion from child-witness' competency hearing because during
hearing, judge asked only simple background questions like age, name, and whether child
knew what telling truth meant, and all questions could have been easily repeated during trial in
defendant's presence), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1234 (1988); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65
(1980) (out-of-court statements admissible if necessity demonstrated by unavailability of wit-
ness and reliability of statements); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (right to
exclude out-of-court statements)).
69. Id.
70. Id. Specifically, Justice Scalia stated that those implicit rights included: (1) the right
to cross-examination, id. at 2802-03 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295
(1973)); (2) the right to exclude out-of-court statements, id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 63-65 (1980)); and (3) the right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in the proceed-
ings other than the trial itself, id. at 2802-03 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658
(1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1234 (1988)).
71. Id. at 2803.
72. Id. at 2801 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
nings of Western legal culture,73 Justice Scalia cited examples of "folk
justice, gut fairness [and] adversary sportsmanship involved in the con-
frontation notion,"'74 which supported the general perception that telling
a lie about a person to his face was more difficult than telling a lie about a
person behind his back.7" Consequently, face-to-face confrontation nec-
essarily enhanced the validity of the fact-finding process.76 Society per-
ceived face-to-face confrontation as essential to a fair trial and the best
method to achieve true testimony.77
In holding that the right to face-to-face confrontation was absolute,
Justice Scalia stated that a witness' trauma resulting from face-to-face
confrontation could not displace an essential constitutional right of the
accused. 78 He recognized that trauma may result from reliving the past
and telling the truth-the two may be intricately bound.79 However,
even though face-to-face confrontation may upset the abused child-wit-
ness, it may also confound the false accuser, or reveal the child coached
by a malevolent adult. Stated Scalia, "It is a truism that constitutional
protections have costs."'
Although Justice Scalia held that the defendant's confrontation
right was absolute, he stated that he would not decide whether excep-
tions existed to the literal right to confrontation because the trial court
made no special finding of necessity that a face-to-face meeting at trial
would have adversely affected the child-witnesses.8" Justice Scalia stated
that a legislatively imposed presumption of trauma, as created by the
Iowa statute, did not suffice to establish necessity. 2 Exceptions to a face-
to-face encounter at trial must be based on more than a general statutory
73. Id. at 2800.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2802. Justice Scalia observed that a witness "'may feel quite differently when he
has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or misstat-
ing the facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that man is.'" Id. (quoting Z.
CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 35 (1956)). Additionally, Justice Scalia pointed out
that when a lie is told to a person's face, it will often be told less convincingly. Id. Justice
Scalia noted that the Confrontation Clause does not compel a witness to fix his eyes on the
defendant; however, the jury remains free to draw its own conclusions about the truthfulness
of the testimony. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1234 (1988)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Indeed, Justice Scalia asked the prosecutor in Coy to concede that face-to-face
confrontation at trial profoundly affected the witness. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2803.
82. Id. Alternatively, the dissent argued that since the Iowa statute presumed necessity,
no individual finding of necessity was required. Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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declaration of necessity.83 If any exceptions to the right to a face-to-face
encounter at trial do exist, Justice Scalia would only allow them when
necessary to further an important public policy,84 or when the exception
was" 'firmly... rooted in our jurisprudence.' "85 A 1985 statute, Justice
Scalia noted, was not firmly rooted.
8 6
As an advocate of judicial restraint,87 Justice Scalia refused to de-
cide a constitutional question not squarely presented by Coy. The trial
court failed to make a particular finding of necessity, and the state's stat-
utory presumption of trauma could not displace the most literal applica-
tion of the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, Justice Scalia would not
determine whether the trial procedure used in Coy qualified as a public
policy exception to face-to-face confrontation that passed constitutional
muster.
Applying these principles to the facts in Coy, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the Iowa statute violated the defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation.8 8 The screen allowed the witnesses to avoid viewing
the defendant while testifying, wholly preventing a face-to-face encoun-
ter, and thereby literally violating the Confrontation Clause.89
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality opinion in Coy v. Iowa
that the defendant's confrontation rights were violated.9" However, Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurrence91 clearly showed that a majority of the
Court did not support Justice Scalia's strict Confrontation Clause inter-
pretation. In contrast to Justice Scalia's absolutist view of the Confron-
tation Clause, Justice O'Connor would balance important competing
interests against the defendant's confrontation right. Therefore, she be-
83. Id. at 2803. Even with exceptions to cross-examination and hearsay, the law requires
something more than the type of generalized finding underlying such a statute when the excep-
tion is not" 'firmly... rooted in our jurisprudence."' Id. (quoting Boujaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)).
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)). However, recently,
one state supreme court has interpreted Justice Scalia's statement to mean that Justice Scalia
would recognize exceptions. Craig v. Maryland, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1160 (1989).
86. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
87. See Karlin, supra note 53, at 631-32.
88. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
89. Id. at 2802. Justice Scalia did not address the State's argument that any Confrontation
Clause error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2803. Finding no sixth
amendment violation, the Iowa Supreme Court did not reach the harmless error issue.
90. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice White joined. Both
concurred in the judgment only. Id.
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lieved that prosecuting certain criminals such as alleged child molesters
may warrant an exception to a defendant's right to a face-to-face meeting
at trial.
92
Justice O'Connor believed that the plurality opinion only dictated
that more than a generalized legislative finding of necessity was required
before the Iowa statutory procedure 93 would apply.94  Noting that the
trial judge in Coy made no such case-specific finding, Justice O'Connor
agreed with the plurality that use of the protective screen at the defend-
ant's trial violated his confrontation rights.95 However, if the court made
a specific finding that facing the defendant in court would unduly trau-
matize the child, Justice O'Connor believed that the court should permit
special procedures to protect the child from psychological trauma while
testifying.
96
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor was willing to reach beyond
the case at hand to decide this issue. Justice O'Connor's concern with
the importance of prosecuting child-abuse cases accorded more deference
to special courtroom protections in child-abuse cases. 97 She believed that
without such protections for child-witnesses, child molesters would es-
cape prosecution.9" Therefore, under certain circumstances, and within
certain procedural frameworks, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
core right to confrontation may yield to the compelling state interest of
protecting sexually abused child-witnesses. 99
Significantly, Justice O'Connor recognized the necessity of protec-
tive trial procedures'to facilitate the prosecution of child-abuse eases. 10°
She cited many studies that have determined that a child will suffer se-
vere psychological trauma from exposure to the harsh courtroom atmos-
phere. 01 Protective measures shield the child, prevent trauma, and help
ease the testifying process.
10 2
92. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
94. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra note 102 for a list of relevant state
statutes.
97. Id. at 2803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
100. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that child abuse cases are very
difficult to prosecute because the child is often the only witness to the crime. Id. (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987)).
101. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that half of the states use one-
or two-way closed-circuit television to facilitate the child's testimony. Id. (O'Connor, J., con-
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While Justice Scalia refused to address exceptions to the defendant's
right to a face-to-face encounter at trial,10 3 Justice O'Connor believed in
balancing the defendant's rights against the witnesses', as she explored
possible exceptions to the Confrontation Clause."° Justice O'Connor re-
jected the plurality's view that the right to face-to-face confrontation is
absolute "even if located at the 'core' of the Confrontation Clause."
°10 5
Rather, Supreme Court precedent recognizes a general "preference" that
the witness face the defendant while testifying, and that the Court may
override this preference in certain circumstances if necessary.10 6 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that such a literal interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause would bar all hearsay evidence that the Court admits as an excep-
tion to the general requirement of a face-to-face meeting at trial.' 7 The
sixth amendment does not intend such an extreme approach.
10 8
Although Justice Scalia refused to discuss the possibility of allowing
special trial procedures to protect children testifying in court,'09 Justice
O'Connor stated that she would allow a particular trial method that pre-
vented face-to-face confrontation if that procedure were necessary to fur-
ther an important public policy.110 Justice O'Connor believed that
shielding a child-victim of sexual abuse from the trauma of courtroom
curring). States authorizing testimony by one-way television include: ALA. CODE § 15-25-3
(Supp. 1987); GA. CODE § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987). Two-way systems permit the child to see the
courtroom and the defendant over a video monitor. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West
Supp. 1988) (two-way closed circuit television); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1988) (two-way closed circuit television). Thirty-three states allow the use of
videotaped testimony, usually taken in the defendant's presence and then broadcast in the
courtroom for the jury. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing ALA. CODE
§ 15-25-3 (Supp. 1987) (one-way closed circuit television; requires defendant to be in same
room as witness); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987) (one-way closed circuit television;
requires defendant to be in same room as witness)). Other states' statutes require a case-spe-
cific finding of necessity before allowing the prosecution to resort to protective trial proce-
dures. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 92.54(4)
(1987); MASS. GEN. L. § 278:16D(b)(1) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West
Supp. 1988).
103. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
104. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295
(1973) ("Of course, the right to confront.., is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow
to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.")).
106. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ohio ,y. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
107. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
182 (1987)).
108. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182
(1987); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
109. Id. at 2803.
110. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)).
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testimony qualified as a critical competing interest."1 ' Indeed, a trial
procedure such as the Iowa statute that affected the literal right to a face-
to-face encounter at trial would not alter this conclusion.' 1 2 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that many legislative procedures designed to protect
child-witnesses may pose no Confrontation Clause issue since they in-
volve testimony in the presence of the accused and call for a case-specific
finding of necessity.l1 3 Even if the state procedure violated the Confron-
tation Clause's general requirements, Justice O'Connor explained that
the procedure may qualify as an exception to the Clause's general prefer-
ence for face-to-face confrontation. 14  However, to apply a trial proce-
dure that called for something other than face-to-face confrontation, the
court must first determine that the procedure was necessary to protect
the child-witness from psychological trauma.1 "'
C. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
In contrast, Justice Blackmun stated that the procedure used at de-
fendant's trial did not violate the purposes of the Confrontation
Clause." 6 Justice Blackmun believed that the essence of Confrontation
Clause protection was the right to be shown that the accuser is real and
the right to cross-examine the accuser in front of the jury," 7 not the
witness' ability to see the defendant while testifying."' Furthermore, he
stated that a compelling state interest existed to protect child-victims of
sexual abuse 11 and to facilitate child-abuse prosecutions, which justified
111. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor cited the following state
codes that require the witness to testify in the same room as the defendant: ALA. CODE § 15-
25-3 (Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987) (one-way closed circuit television;
defendant must be in the same room as witness). Justice O'Connor noted that the following
state statutes require the court to make a case-specific finding of necessity: CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1347 (d)(1) (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 92.54(4) (1987); MASS. GEN. L.
§ 278:16D(b)(1) (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (Supp. 1988). Coy, 108 S. Ct. at
2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2806 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice Blackmun in the dissent. Id.
117. Id. at 2805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242-43 (1895)).
118. Id. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun observed that the number of
child abuse incidents continues to rise. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTION OF CHILDREN, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT
AND ABUSE REPORTING, 1985 3, 18 (1987)).
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minimal infringements on a defendant's right to confrontation.12 ° The
necessity of protecting child-witnesses qualified as an important public
interest,12' and a legislatively created presumption of trauma sufficed to
limit the confrontation right.'22 Therefore, Justice Blackmun found judi-
cial review of the protective trial method unnecessary. Ultimately, Jus-
tice Blackmun presumed the Iowa trial procedure'23 constitutional
although it infringed on a constitutional right. 24
Justice Blackmun explained that a witness' ability to see the defend-
ant while testifying never constituted an essential Confrontation Clause
protection since only one Supreme Court case has supported the require-
ment of a face-to-face encounter during witness testimony. 125 However,
he stated, even that case held that the purposes of the Confrontation
Clause were to prevent "'ex parte affidavits, to provide the opportunity
for cross-examination, and to compel the defendant to stand face-to-face
with the jury.' "126 Justice Blackmun further reasoned that exceptions to
the rule against hearsay, and the fact that blind witnesses cannot see the
defendant, also demonstrate that the ability of a witness to see the de-
fendant while testifying is not essential to the Confrontation Clause.' 27
Justice Blackmun believed the plurality's literal interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause to be an outdated sixth amendment interpreta-
120. Id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that requiring a wit-
ness to view a defendant during testimony would impede states' attempts to facilitate the testi-
mony of child-victims of sex abuse and would lead states to sacrifice other, more central
confrontation interests, such as the right to cross-examination or the right to have the jury
observe the testifying witness. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also believed
that the defendant's due process rights were not violated. Id. at 2809-10 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
121. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice O'Connor that protective proce-
dures such as the Iowa trial procedure enhanced the reliability of child-witnesses' testimony.
Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was concerned that fear and trauma
associated with a child's testimony in a defendant's presence may psychologically injure the
child, prevent effective testimony, and undermine a trial's truth-finding function. Id. at 2808
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
124. Interestingly, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Coy deferred entirely to the state's power
to regulate in the face of an explicit constitutional right. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority in an earlier case, denied states power to infringe upon a woman's right to choose
abortion, a right implied only from the fourteenth amendment right to liberty. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Blackmun, J.).
125. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
126. Id. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970)).
127. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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tion. 12  By the time the Framers ratified the Bill of Rights, the purposes
of the Confrontation Clause had merged with the principle of cross-ex-
amination.1 29 Justice Blackmun noted that the Supreme Court has re-
cently held that cross-examination, testifying under oath, the right to
counsel, and the witness' presence before the jury satisfied the confronta-
tion right.' Since the Iowa trial procedure did not interfere with these
constitutional protections, Justice Blackmun would hold that the defend-
ant's confrontation rights were satisfied.'
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun would construe the Con-
frontation Clause to secure only a preference for a face-to-face encoun-
ter 32 which in certain situations, must yield to compelling public
interests.13 3 However, he saw no reason for the Court to make a specific
finding of necessity to justify a trial procedure that limited the right to a
face-to-face encounter, since legislative exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause were common.' 34 He would not impose a different standard by
requiring the state to make a predicate showing in every case. 135  Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the plurality that, to be constitutional, the trial
procedure must be "'firmly ... rooted in our jurisprudence,' ,136 stating
that that requirement applied only to hearsay issues concerning the relia-
bility of out-of-court statements. 37 Justice Blackmun believed that in
Coy, the testimony was clearly reliable because the two witnesses testified
under oath, in full view of the jury, and were subjected to cross-
128. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2807 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 at 153 n.2) (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
130. Id. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970)).
131. Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
133. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295
(1973); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
134. Id. at 2809 n.6. Justice Blackmun noted that under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Supreme Court precedent, exceptions requiring no case-specific finding include excited utter-
ances, business records, and statements of a co-conspirator. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), 803(2), 803(6).
135. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183
(1987)).
137. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The requirement that an exception to the Confronta-
tion Clause be firmly rooted in our jurisprudence is imposed only when the prosecution tries to
introduce an out-of-court statement, and a question exists as to the statement's reliability. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In the event that the statement offered falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, reliability can be inferred. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S., 56, 66 (1980)).
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examination. 138
Justice Blackmun concluded that the trial procedure did not violate
the defendant's confrontation right. 139 The compelling state interest of
protecting children justified a limited departure from the typical defend-
ant-witness confrontation at a criminal trial."
V. ANALYSIS
The Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants the right to
confront their accusers at trial. 141 However, when the principal witness
testifying against a defendant is a child, the defendant's confrontation
right should be limited. In the past, states have frequently found compel-
ling reasons to grant children special rights. 142 The rights of confronta-
tion, "however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused,
must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case."' 43 However, perfect reconciliation of these two
competing interests is impossible. Nevertheless, neither Justice Scalia's
nor Justice Blackmun's approach in Coy v. Iowa 1 best addressed the
problem.
Justice Scalia's "bright line" absolutist approach ignored the impor-
tance of the state's interest in protecting a child-victim of sexual abuse in
the courtroom in favor of granting the defendant an unrestricted con-
frontation right. Alternatively, Justice Blackmun appeared to defer
blindly to the legislature even though the Iowa trial procedure'45 limited
a constitutional right. Rather than adopting a bright-line rule and re-
quiring a choice between the defendant's right to confrontation or the
child-victim's right to avoid psychological trauma while testifying, the
Supreme Court should accommodate these competing interests by invok-
ing a strict scrutiny test. 146
The Supreme Court has never overruled earlier decisions balancing
138. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
142. See infra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
143. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
144. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
145. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
146. See Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LoY. L.A.L.
REv. 449, 453-54 (1988). Means-end scrntiny involves a three-part analysis: (1) a court first
examines state interests served by the challenged government action; (2) the court reviews the
effectiveness of the means chosen to implement the government interests; and (3) the court
studies alternatives to determine whether less restrictive methods are available to further the
government interests. Id. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court may only restrict a de-
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confrontation rights. 47 However, the Court has yet to decide the weight
to afford to either side of the scale in child sexual abuse cases. By issuing
a plurality opinion in Coy, the Court left the issue open for final
determination.
A. Justice Scalia's Reasoning in Coy v. Iowa
An analysis of the plurality's reasoning necessarily begins with the
fact that prior to Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court never addressed the
issue of the precise scope of the Confrontation Clause. 148 Moreover,
"[t]he exact intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing [the
Confrontation Clause] is probably undiscoverable."' 49 Little research
has been done concerning the right to confrontation.1 50 One commenta-
tor believes that the Confrontation Clause may be interpreted by using
three methods: the historical, the functional, or the conceptual
method. 5 , The historical approach applies the Framers' intent to the
case at hand.' 52 The functional approach looks at the purposes the con-
frontation right serves and then sets forth rules to carry out that purpose
in criminal trials.'53 The conceptual, or definitional approach seeks to
interpret the clause by analyzing case law. 154
Justice Scalia, an interpretivist, used the historical approach in Coy
to define the Confrontation Clause. He looked solely to the Framers'
original intent and the plain meaning of the constitutional text. Justice
Scalia refused to limit or expand this plain meaning absent historical or
explicit textual guidelines. "Confront" means "face-to-face,"' 155 thus, lit-
eral satisfaction of the constitutional provision could occur in no other
way."' 6 Viewing it in this light, Justice Scalia had no choice but to hold
that the screening device violated the defendant's confrontation rights
fendant's right to confrontation, if the state shows a compelling interest and uses the least-
burdensome means available. Id. at 449-55.
147. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Coy v. Iowa, Justice Scalia stated that "most of this
Court's encounters with the Confrontation Clause have involved either the admissibility of
out-of-court statements, or restrictions on the scope of cross-examination." 108 S. Ct. 2798,
2800 (1988).
149. Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1972).
150. Graham, supra note 19, at 104.
151. Id. at 103.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 104.
154. Id. at 103.
155. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
156. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2668 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1234 (1988)). See also Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
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because the screen prevented a face-to-face meeting during the witnesses'
testimony.
Justice Scalia's holding that the Confrontation Clause grants de-
fendants the right to a face-to-face encounter at trial is neither linguisti-
cally nor precedentially controversial.' 57 Commentators also agree that
physical confrontation is an element of the sixth amendment guaran-
tee. 158 While some recent cases use different language, none deny the
preference for a face-to-face meeting. 159 Further, Webster's Dictionary
defines confrontation as: "the bringing face-to-face of an accused person
and his accusing witnesses ... used especially in the phrase right of con-
frontation."' 60 Black's Law Dictionary states: "In criminal law, the act
of setting a witness face-to-face with the prisoner, in order that the latter
may make any objection he has to the witness, or that the witness may
identify the accused." 16' Also, the Confrontation Clause's language
combined with the defendant's sixth amendment implicit guarantee of
the right to be present at every stage of the trial,'62 implies a face-to-face
encounter at trial.'63 As recently as 1987, the Supreme Court has held
157. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800. Justice Scalia quoted several Supreme Court opinions that
recognized that the Confrontation Clause included a right to face-to-face confrontation. Id. at
2800-01 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2669 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(the Confrontation Clause "plainly envisions that witnesses against the accused shall... testify
in his presence"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1234 (1988); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51
(1987) ("The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant:
the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination."); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.5 (1980) (Face-to-face confrontation
"forms the core of the values furnished by the Confrontation Clause"); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("The literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial 'forms'
the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause."); Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325, 329 (1910) ("[T]he plaintiffs in error were not given the opportunity to meet the
witnesses face-to-face, or be confronted with the witnesses."); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S.
47, 55 (1899) ("[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved
against an accused.., except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can
look while being tried . . ."); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) ("The
primary object of the constitutional provision ... was to prevent ex parte affidavits... [test]
the recollection... of the witness, [and] to [compel] him to stand face-to-face with the jury.")).
158. See Graham, supra note 29, at 73; Wixom, supra note 5, at 466-67.
159. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 65 (1980).
160. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 447 (1966).
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 272 (5th ed. 1979).
162. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 340 (1970) ("One of the most basic of the rights guaran-
teed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every
stage of the trial."). See also Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1234 (1988).
163. See Note, Does the Child Witness Videotape Statute Violate the Confrontation Clause?:
Article 38.071, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 17 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1669, 1676 (1986).
See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 667 (2d ed. 1986).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
that the Confrontation Clause provides two kinds of protection for a de-
fendant: the right to physically face the witnesses testifying against him,
and the right to cross-examination.'
Justice Scalia's interpretation also responds to the Confrontation
Clause's symbolic function. The idea that one who accuses another of a
crime should do so in a forum where he assumes the consequences of his
accusations carries much weight. 6 Through the sixth amendment, the
Framers sought to prevent trials like Sir Walter Raleigh's, and convic-
tions based on evidence that the defendant has no opportunity to test.
Although the historical approach protects Justice Scalia from
charges of rewriting the Constitution, it neglects the dynamic potential of
the ideals embodied in the Confrontation Clause. The sixth amendment
describes a vision of justice, not merely a set of rules.' 66 In applying
values sought to be promoted by the sixth amendment to current cases,
room for principled judicial rule-making exists. In the largest sense, the
sixth amendment promotes individual dignity by protecting the defend-
ant from arbitrary state action. Even if issues of child abuse did concern
the Framers, the Framers could not have considered how to handle an
abused chijd's videotaped testimony or other legislative safeguards to
protect child-abuse victims from psychological trauma while testify-
ing.' 67 If contemporary psychological insights offer better awareness of
the dangerous effects of courtroom testimony on child-victims, and if
technological developments make it possible to respect the defendant's
right to a public trial in the presence of his accusers, then no reason exists
to hold the sixth amendment to a literal requirement of face-to-face
confrontation.
The Framers knew well that those accused by the State needed pro-
tection of their individual rights and dignity.' 68 However, this under-
standing should not preclude the legislature from seeking to promote the
general welfare. The State's interest in prosecuting child abusers is clear
and compelling. A Confrontation Clause interpretation that wholly ig-
nores the complaining witness' dignitary interests should not be accepted
unless a balancing approach is unworkable. The Supreme Court has in
fact held that sixth amendment interests may be balanced against over-
riding compelling state interests.'
69
164. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S.
15 (1985)).
165. See C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 667 (2d ed. 1986).
166. See Graham supra note 19, at 103.
167. See id.
168. E. BARRETr & W. COHEN, supra note 24, at 17.
169. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) ("competing interests, if 'closely ex-
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B. The Confrontation Clause Guarantee of a Constitutional Right
Distinct From the Rule Against Hearsay
One well-recognized exception to the right to face-to-face confronta-
tion is hearsay. However, the scope of the Confrontation Clause cannot
be determined using hearsay rules. Hearsay exceptions permit a testify-
ing witness to state what a non-testifying witness said out of court. Hear-
say is an evidentiary exclusion rule based on a preference for reliable
evidence.170 Yet, hearsay deprives the defendant of the opportunity to
cross-examine the non-testifying witness and is only admitted when the
out-of-court context serves as an adequate indication of the statement's
truth and reliability. 171 To ensure truthfulness, various reliability re-
quirements constrain the rule. 172 Nevertheless, hearsay exceptions de-
prive the defendant of the opportunity to confront face-to-face his
accusers who do not appear in court and who are heard only through the
testifying witness' words.
Many courts and commentators, including Justice Blackmun in his
dissent in Coy v. Iowa,'73 view the Confrontation Clause as merely an
evidentiary presumption against the admissibility of hearsay. 174 This in-
terpretation derives from Dean Wigmore, who eloquently and forcefully
defined the Confrontation Clause according to evidence law. 175  One
commentator believes that Wigmore's lack of sympathy to the individ-
ual's claims against the state led him to reduce the Confrontation Clause
amined,' may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial"); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973) ("[T]he right... to cross-examine [witnesses] is not absolute and may, in
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests.").
170. Arenson, supra note 3, at 19.
171. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1970); Note, Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 (1965).
172. The Supreme Court has limited admissibility of hearsay statements to those that
demonstrate a high degree of reliability. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1973).
See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.").
173. 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801 n.2 (1988).
174. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 71, 86 (1970). See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-
07 (1965); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). See generally 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 131 (3d ed. 1940).
175. Graham, supra note 19, at 104; Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the
Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 340-41 (1981). However, Professor Graham believes
that reliance on Wigmore's thesis to interpret the Confrontation Clause is misplaced. Graham,
supra note 19, at 104. Professor Graham stated that Wigmore's fanatical interest in hearsay
reform, and opposition to the doctrine of criminal evidence, led him to shun the various consti-
tutional limitations on the use of evidence in criminal trials. Id. at 104 n.24.
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to a right to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the prosecutor at
trial.' 7 6 Interestingly, in Coy, Justice Blackmun strongly deferred to
state legislation and cited Wigmore to support his Confrontation Clause
analysis.' 77 Indeed, the Supreme Court has affirmed Wigmore's evidence
thesis that the goals of confrontation are to generate reliability and to
accommodate necessity-the same goals sought by rules against
hearsay. 178
In one recent case, Perez v. State,'7 9 the Florida Supreme Court
seemed to ignore the precise distinction between confrontation and hear-
say that Justice Scalia emphasized in Coy. In Perez, the court admitted
into evidence a three year-old child's hearsay statements made to his
mother and two investigating officers regarding an alleged sexual as-
sault. 180 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the child's
hearsay statements sufficiently reliable, and determined that the child
was unavailable as a witness due to a substantial likelihood of severe
emotional distress if required to participate in the trial.1"' The defendant
appealed, arguing that the trial court unconstitutionally denied him the
opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. 182 The Florida
Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's argument, noting that the
United States Supreme Court rejected the view that the Confrontation
Clause bars the use of any out-of-court statements, and held that the
defendant's confrontation right was satisfied since the witness' statement
bore adequate indicia of reliability.' 83 Thus, the court used an unavaila-
bility rule based on hearsay admissibility to determine whether the de-
fendant's confrontation rights were violated, offering the defendant no
additional constitutional protection beyond that provided by evidence
law.
In Coy, Justice Scalia distinguished the Confrontation Clause from
evidence law.' 84 Specifically, he criticized the dissent's reliance on Dean
Wigmore to interpret the Confrontation Clause, 85 arguing that Wigmore
176. Graham, supra note 19, at 104 n.24 (citing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 131 (3d ed.
1940)).
177. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
131 (3d ed. 1940)).
178. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see also
Gutman, supra note 175, at 337.
179. 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
180. Id. at 207-08.
181. Id. at 208.
182. Id. at 209.
183. Id. at 209-10 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
184. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801 n.2.
185. Id.
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presented merely an evidence theorist's thesis that the confrontation
right only protects the right to cross-examine the witness.186 Justice
Scalia captured the basic flaw in the Wigmore theory. To say that the
right to cross-examine exhausts the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights, because the purpose of the Confrontation Clause can be effectu-
ated by hearsay protection, ignores the fact that the Clause itself requires
"confrontation." 187 Under Wigmore's logic, Justice Scalia stated that
one could dispense with the Constitution's specific jury trial requirement
by showing that the accused was justly convicted and publicly known to
be justly convicted.188
Justice Scalia correctly criticized the dissent. The Supreme Court
has stated that although the Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary
hearsay rule stem from the same roots, they do not protect identical
rights. 189 Confrontation is a fundamental trial right. 190 Hearsay is an
evidentiary rule involving statements made out of court. Commentators
recognize that confrontation encompasses a greater right than an eviden-
tiary rule of exclusion. 191 Satisfaction of one does not entail compliance
with the other, 192 since evidence admissible as an exception to hearsay
may still violate the Confrontation Clause and confrontation rights may
be satisfied although the hearsay rule is violated.
193
Courts and commentators have used evidence law to illuminate
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, 158 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
188. Id. Furthermore, Justice Scalia believed that Wigmore contradicted himself by stating
that a secondary purpose of confrontation is to produce a " 'certain subjective moral effect...
upon the witness' "designed to bring out the truth during testimony before the jury. Id. (quot-
ing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, 153 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)). Justice Scalia be-
lieved that Wigmore's theory, that the truth-enhancing effect resulted from a witness' presence
before a tribunal, and not a witness' presence before the defendant, had no support. Id.; see 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, 154 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). Justice Scalia further criti-
cized Wigmore's thesis as implausible since the phrase "'be confronted with the witnesses
against him'" was, to Justice Scalia, a "strange way to express a guarantee of nothing more
than cross-examination." Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802 n.2 (criticizing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1395, 154 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
189. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86; Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56.
190. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405
(1965).
191. Seildelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
76, 82 (1971). Due process under the fifth or fourteenth amendments, not the Confrontation
Clause, is the appropriate standard by which to test federal or state rules of evidence in crimi-
nal trials. Id. at 91. See Jonakait, supra note 30, at 575.
192. Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56; Arenson, supra note 3, at 16; Note, supra note 171, at 1436.
193. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 710,
722 (1968).
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Confrontation Clause issues. 194 Face-to-face confrontation rarely poses
an issue at trial, thus, little research has been done in the Confrontation
Clause field as compared to the evidence field.195 Dean Wigmore, Profes-
sor McCormick, and Judge Weinstein are only a few of the many schol-
ars who have written about evidence law. Unlike most other
constitutional doctrines, there is no contemporaneous construction.
196
The United States Supreme Court decided its first Confrontation Clause
case one hundred years after the Framers adopted the sixth
amendment. 197
The Confrontation Clause embodies notions of individual rights far
broader than the technical hearsay rules. The confrontation right' 98 pro-
vides the criminal defendant with the opportunity to defend himself
through our adversary system by prohibiting ex parte trials, 199 granting
the defendant an opportunity to test the evidence in front of the jury,2°0
and guaranteeing the right to face-to-face confrontation. 20 1 By using
hearsay to determine the scope of confrontation, the Confrontation
Clause would cease to be a guarantee of individual liberty, secured
through the simultaneous functioning of its components interpreted like
other fundamental rights, to become a "mere vestigial appendix of the
hearsay doctrine. ' '20  This would deprive the Confrontation Clause of
any force beyond that which the hearsay rule already provides, thus ren-
dering the Confrontation Clause useless.
2 0 3
C. The Precedent for Limiting the Defendant's Right to Confrontation
in Light of the Compelling State Interest to
Protect Child- Witnesses
1. The Supreme Court's limitation of other fundamental rights
The Supreme Court has limited fundamental constitutional protec-
194. See generally Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56; Dutton, 400 U.S. at 74; Green, 399 U.S. at 149; 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 131 (3d ed. 1940).
195. Jonakait, supra note 30, at 578.
196. Graham, supra note 19, at 104.
197. Id. The first Supreme Court decision to interpret the Confrontation Clause was Mat-
tox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
198. The confrontation right is only one of several rights contained in the sixth amend-
ment. The sixth amendment also guarantees the right to a speedy and public jury trial, the
right to counsel, the right to present evidence on one's own behalf, and the right to confront
one's adverse witnesses. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
199. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43.
200. Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55.
201. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801.
202. Jonakait, supra note 30, at 575.
203. Id. at 577.
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tions when costs of preserving them simply prove too high. For example,
political speech, a core first amendment right, enables our system of rep-
resentative government to operate by permitting political and social
change to come about peacefully through public discussion rather than
through violence.2" The first amendment prohibits the government
from suppressing ideas on the theory that one can only determine the
truth of any idea in the "marketplace" of competing thoughts.20 5 Re-
striction of political speech subverts the democratic process.2 °6
However, although the first amendment protects freedom of speech
in absolute terms,20 7 the Supreme Court has never treated first amend-
ment guarantees as absolute.20 8 In certain situations, the Court will bal-
ance an individual's right to free expression against other societal
interests.20 9
The first amendment will not necessarily protect all political speech
that "directs to inciting or producing imminent lawless action," and
which is also "likely to incite or produce such action."21 0 However, the
legislature refuses to stifle legitimate dissent, since the Supreme Court
has distinguished general political dissent and advocacy of abstract theo-
ries, which cannot be punished, from incitement of particular illegal acts
204. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill recognized the public good which resulted from the
free exchange of ideas.
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can
certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. Secondly,
though the silenced opinion be an error, it may and very commonly does, contain a
portion of truth, and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely
or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the re-
mainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Thirdly, even if the received
opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually
is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held
in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational
grounds. And not only this, but, fourth, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in
danger of being lost or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and
conduct ....
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 11 (1859). See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
205. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (3d ed. 1986).
207. The first amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .. " U.S. CONT. amend. I (emphasis added).
208. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982); J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, supra note 206, at 853.
209. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (restrictions on commercial speech not allowed); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (restrictions on obscenity allowed).
210. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Brandenburg Court prohibited speech
advocating unlawful conduct. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, supra note 206, at 864.
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which dre punishable.2 1'
Although the Court will balance first amendment rights against
competing interests, the first amendment's importance has not been less-
ened.2 12 Indeed, the value of free speech is enhanced by protecting the
very governmental framework that ensures the right. Thus, the Consti-
tution places the burden of reconciling the conflicting interests of the
individual and society on the Court.21 3 To be sure, the Supreme Court
will only restrict first amendment political speech rights when the costs
produced by certain types of speech prove too high for the benefits polit-
ical speech may have.214
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,215 the Supreme Court
held that the first amendment right of access to criminal trials216 is not
absolute, and may be balanced against other competing state interests.
21 7
The Court stated that "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor" was a compelling state interest which warranted limit-
ing the defendant child molester's first amendment rights.218 Interest-
ingly, the arguments made for limiting the defendant's first amendment
right in Globe Newspaper parallel those made by Justice O'Connor in her
concurrence in Coy v. Iowa, differing only in the constitutional right
protected.219
211. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, supra note 206, at 853.
212. Id. (citing Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 905 (1963)). For a contrary view, see generally Frank, Hugo L. Black-" Free Speech and
the Declaration of Independence, in SIX JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 11, 31-37 (R. Rotunda,
ed. 1983).
213. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, supra note 206, at 853 (citing Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 905 (1963)). In Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall stated
that when the Supreme Court identifies a conflict between a constitutional provision and a
congressional statute, the Court has the authority and the duty to declare the statute unconsti-
tutional and to refuse to enforce it. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
The Court, not the legislature, determines whether an Act of Congress conflicts with the Con-
stitution. Id.
214. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (per curiam) (state may not "forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
215. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
216. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme Court
held that the press and public have a first amendment right of access to criminal trials. Id. at
576. The text of the first amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom ... of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
217. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-11.
218. Id. at 607.
219. See id. at 606-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Globe Newspaper, Justice Brennan
emphasized that the majority's holding did not apply outside of criminal trials. Id. at 611
n.27. In Coy, Justice Brennan joined Justice Scalia's plurality opinion but emphasized that the
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The Globe Newspaper Company desired access to a rape trial of
three minor-victims. 220 The newspaper contested a state statute2 21 re-
quiring the trial judge to exclude the press and general public from the
courtroom during the testimony of minor-victims in cases involving sex-
ual offenses.222 Although the Court held that the mandatory exclusion
rule violated Globe Newspaper's first amendment right of access to crim-
inal trials,223 the Court recognized that compelling circumstances exist
where courts may exclude the press and general public during the testi-
mony of minor-victims of sexual abuse. 224 The Court held that a state
may deny the right of access only when the trial court demonstrated that
a compelling governmental interest necessitated denial of access and that
the exclusion was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.225
In Globe Newspaper, the statute served the purpose of encouraging
young victims of sexual offenses to testify truthfully in court, while
shielding them against undue psychological harm and embarrassment
while testifying.226 The Court agreed that guarding the physical and psy-
chological well-being of a minor served a compelling state interest; how-
ever, the Court held that the state may not have a mandatory closure rule
unless the circumstances of the particular case determined that closure
screen in no way prejudiced the defendant's trial. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2810 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). In Globe Newspaper, Justice Rehnquist stated that the minimal impact of the Massa-
chusetts law, excluding the press and public from the courtroom during the child rape-victim's
testimony, on first amendment rights, and the overriding weight of the state's interest in pro-
tecting child rape victims, justified the constitutionality of the state law. Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 616 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In both Coy and Globe Newspaper, Justice Rehnquist
believed that the state statute need not be narrowly tailored, and remarked that legislative
exceptions to constitutional rights were common. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 n.6 (Blackmun, J., &
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 616 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
Globe Newspaper, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Court need look only at whether the
restrictions imposed on the first amendment were reasonable, and whether the state's interests
overrode the limited effects of the law on the first amendment rights. Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 616 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974); Sarbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974)). In his dissenting opin-
ion in Coy, Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, cited cases in which the
Supreme Court allowed admission of evidence absent a case-specific inquiry of necessity. 108 S.
Ct. at 2809 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)).
220. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 598.
221. MASS. GEN. L., ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
222. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 598.
223. Id. at 610-11.
224. Id. at 606-07 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). See
also, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, supra note 206, at 1021.
225. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
226. Id. at 600, 607.
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was necessary to protect the minor-victim's welfare.227 Factors that the
trial court should weigh, the Supreme Court held, include the minor-
victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the
crime, and the victim's desires.228
In Globe Newspaper, these factors were not satisfied: The state did
not move for closure, the minor-victims' names were already public
knowledge, and the victims may have been willing to testify despite the
presence of the press and public.229 Therefore, the Court held that the
state statute was not narrowly tailored to the state's interest of protecting
testifying minor-victims of sexual abuse. 230 This interest could have been
served by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the state's legitimate concern for the minor-victim's psychologi-
cal well being necessitated closure.231 This approach would help ensure
that the state will not restrict the public's and press' first amendment
right to access of criminal trials except where necessary to further a com-
pelling state interest.
232
As is clear from the Court's majority opinion in Globe Newspaper,
the Court will balance a defendant's constitutional right against the com-
pelling state interest of protecting children. In Globe Newspaper, the
Supreme Court found it necessary to qualify the defendant's first amend-
ment right to a public trial in order to protect child-witnesses. Likewise,
in certain cases, the well-being of a child justifies limiting a defendant's
sixth amendment right to confrontation.
Although the sixth amendment, like the first amendment, is stated
in absolute terms, courts should also balance this right against compel-
ling state interests when the costs of requiring a face-to-face encounter at
trial for child-witnesses prove much higher than the perceived benefits.
In conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face confronta-
tion, the sixth amendment establishes a presumptive rule of necessity.233
Therefore, in certain circumstances, when advantages from actual con-
frontation between the child and the defendant in the courtroom are only
227. Id. at 608. In Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Coy, she stated that "if a court makes
a case-specific finding of necessity" she "would permit use of a particular trial procedure that
called for something other than face-to-face confrontation." 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In Globe Newspaper, the Court held that "a trial court can determine on a case-
by-case basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim." Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.
228. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.
229. Id. at 608-09.
230. Id. at 609.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
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incidental compared to the trauma the child may suffer while testifying,
courts should limit the defendant's confrontation right.
In order to limit a fundamental right like the confrontation right,
the courts should invoke a strict scrutiny test as used with other funda-
mental constitutional rights.234 Under this test, the state must first show
that an essential interest is at stake and that no less intrusive means are
available to serve the state's interest equally well.235 In other words, the
government may only restrict that right where necessary to accomplish
some compelling state interest, and only to the extent necessary to satisfy
that need.236 The government may not pursue a legitimate legislative
purpose using means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the state can achieve the ends more narrowly.237
In Coy, the state did not demonstrate that the screen was necessary
to protect the children from potential psychological trauma.238 The state
failed to support its application for a one-way screen, by affidavit or
otherwise, and neglected to establish that a barrier was necessary in this
particular case. Without a finding that the children needed the special
protections provided by the Iowa statute,239 no reason justified restricting
the defendant's right to confrontation. 2' Thus, the Court could not up-
hold the statutory procedure. 241
To find that the children warranted special protection, "[t]he basis
for such a premise must be established both in fact as well as in logic, and
its dimensions must be spelled out in terms of its nature, degree and po-
234. For example, the Court invokes a strict scrutiny analysis in cases involving racial clas-
sifications, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Galloway, supra note 146, at 453 n. 16.
235. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) ("Such classifications are sub-
ject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary to the accomplishment' of their legit-
imate purpose."); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest" should be used); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) ("necessary to promote a compelling state interest").
236. Galloway, supra note 146, at 453.
237. Id. at 451-52.
238. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805, 2809.
239. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
240. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. The Roberts Court stated that with
the Framers' preference for face-to-face confrontation, the Confrontation Clause established a
rule of necessity to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. The
prosecution had to demonstrate a declarant's unavailability if it wished to use the declarant's
statement against the defendant. Id. Once a witness was shown to be unavailable, the Roberts
Court held the Confrontation Clause allowed only hearsay that was trustworthy. Id. See also
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 710 (1968).
241. A court cannot limit a defendant's confrontation rights without a finding of necessity.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
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tential duration. '242 Psychiatric evidence shows that each child-victim
reacts to an offense and its aftermath in his or her own way.243 Thus, one
cannot justify excusing all child-victims from testifying, nor can one im-
pose the duty on all of them to testify. Each child's case deserves its own
individual consideration. 2 4
2. Protection of children testifying in the courtroom
"The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the
interests of minor children, particularly those of tender years. "
24
1
Face-to-face confrontation before an arbiter in a public forum re-
mains the hallmark of Anglo-American criminal trials, 246 allowing for
the adversarial testing of evidence.247 Yet, if facing the defendant in
court will unduly traumatize the child, trial procedures should prevent
this situation. However, changing a system that the Constitution re-
quires and that society has accepted as an adequate method for prosecut-
ing criminals and protecting the innocent must be done with care.248
Although age is not a suspect classification warranting equal protec-
tion scrutiny, 249 in certain circumstances, our legal system provides dif-
ferent rules depending on whether the person is a child, an adult, or an
elderly person because of the difference in capabilities each has according
242. Hocheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 793, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 289
(1984).
243. Libai, supra note 11, at 1009.
244. Several state statutes require a case-specific finding of necessity before allowing the
trial court to use a trial procedure which limits a defendant's confrontation right. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 92.54(4) (1987); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(1) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-324(b) (West Supp. 1989).
245. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
246. Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Ac-
complished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
115, 117 (1985).
247. Jonakait, supra note 30, at 586.
248. Mlyniec & Daily, supra note 246, at 117.
249. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311-13 (1976). In Murgia,
the Supreme Court held that age is not a suspect classification entitled to strict scrutiny. Id. at
312. The Court held that a Massachusetts statute calling for mandatory retirement at age 50
did not deny a police officer equal protection. Id. The Court concluded that the class of
uniformed state police officers over 50 was not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection
analysis. Id. at 313. The Court's rationale was that the elderly, unlike those who have been
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a "history of
purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of "stereo-
typed characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities." Id. "Even if the statute could be
said to impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged," the Court held "it would not impose
a distinction sufficiently akin to those classifications that [it] ha[s] found suspect to call for
strict judicial scrutiny." Id.
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to his age. John Locke, one of the primary philosophers who influenced
our Constitution, believed that children differ from adults:
Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in
full possession of their strength and reason, and so was capable
from the first instant of his being to provide for his own support
and preservation and govern his actions according to the dic-
tates of the law of reason which God had implanted on him.
From him the world is peopled with his descendants who are all
born infants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or under-
standing; but to supply the defects of this imperfect state till the
improvements of growth and age has removed them, Adam and
Eve, and after them all parents, were, by the law of nature,
under an obligation to preserve, nourish and educate the chil-
dren they had begotten.25 0
Lockean thought provided many ideas for the American Revolution of
1776.25 In fact, one commentator noted that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence proved so close to Locke in form, phraseology and content,
that someone accused Jefferson of copying Locke's Second Treatise.252
Thus, even under Justice Scalia's narrow interpretivist approach, a "chil-
dren's exception" to strict Confrontation Clause requirements seems
reasonable.
Psychological studies demonstrate that a child's cognitive level dif-
fers from an adult's.253 To the extent that children lack certain basic
skills their minds differ qualitatively from adults'." 4 Children develop
from being able to perceive only concrete symbols, to being able to con-
ceive of the world in symbolic and abstract terms.2"5 Accordingly, legal
principles designed for adult psyches may often prove incomprehensible
and even traumatic when applied to children.256
250. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 32 (T. Peardon rev. ed. 1952)
(Ist ed. 1690) (emphasis in original).
251. Id. at vii.
252. Id. at xx.
253. Cognition refers to the human mental processes involved in: (1) perception-the de-
tection, organization and interpretation of information from both the outside world and the
internal environment; (2) memory-the storage and retrieval of the perceived information; (3)
reasoning-the use of knowledge to make inferences and draw conclusions; (4) reflection-the
evaluation of the quality of ideas and solutions; and (5) insight-the recognition of new rela-
tionships between two or more segments of knowledge. P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KAGAN,
CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY 234 (5th ed. 1979).
254. H. GLEITMAN, BASIC PSYCHOLOGY 209 (1983).
255. See J. PIAGET, LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY (1953); J. PIAGET, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTELLIGENCE (1950). See also P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KAGAN, supra note 253, at 281.
256. Libai, supra note 11, at 999; Wixom, supra note 5, at 464.
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Jean Piaget composed a theory to explain the normal course of cog-
nitive development that all children pass through to become adults.
257
Piaget believed that children grow to adulthood through a series of con-
tinuous stages, followed in the same order, although at varying speeds.2 8
During any one stage, children are capable of different patterns of behav-
ior;25 9 however, underlying each stage is a common structure explaining
the stage, and giving the stage its unity.260 Transition to a new stage
involves fundamental reorganization in the child's mind, with each stage
building on the one before it until the child reaches adulthood, and the
mind reaches maturity.
261
Children generally do not understand abstract concepts such as duty
or truth,262 and therefore, children may not comprehend the Constitu-
tion's goal of protecting the defendant's rights in the adversarial sense.
Children may not realize that the incomprehensible trial experience is
designed to elicit the truth, not merely to embarrass and scare the child
in front of all those adults. The judge, wearing an impressive'black robe,
can be a frightening figure, and the intimidation is only exacerbated
when the twelve jurors, all adults, stare intently at the child throughout
the trial. Such a situation is not likely to aid the child in testifying accu-
rately and truthfully; rather, anxiety breeds confusion in children and
leads to lies or to silence.263
In light of the well-recognized differences between children and
adults, many areas of Anglo-American law have found compelling rea-
sons to treat children differently. Under contract law, a minor lacks the
capacity to contract.264 For the tort of negligence, courts distinguish
257. See J. PIAGET, BIOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE (1971); J. PIAGET, LOGIC AND PSY-
CHOLOGY (1953); J. PIAGET, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE (1950); J. PIAGET, JUDG-
MENT AND REASONING IN THE CHILD (1929).
258. J. PIAGET, The Child in Reality, in THE ESSENTIAL PIAGET 814-19 (1977).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See D. BiORKLUND, CHILDREN'S THINKING, DEVELOPMENTAL FUNCTION AND IN-
DIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 112-13 (1989); R. CASE, INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT, BIRTH TO
ADULTHOOD 108-17 (1985).
263. See Mahady-Smith, supra note 7, at 743. See also State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super.
411, 413, 484 A.2d 1333 (1984). In Sheppard, the court recognized problems involved when
frightened children testify before the court: "Children who did testify ... frequently 'forgot'
details, changed stories, or presented inconsistent facts. Ultimately, many broke down, cried,
ignored questions and eventually refused to answer." Id.
264. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: "Unless a statute provides otherwise, a
natural person has capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the
day before the person's eighteenth birthday." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14
(1985); see also I CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 6 (1963 & Supp. 1980); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§§ 222-48 (3d ed. 1959).
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children from adults by holding children to a subjective rather than an
265objective standard of care. Constitutional law holds child pornogra-
phy to a different standard from adult pornography.266
Similarly, in criminal law, testifying child witnesses of sex abuse
should receive special courtroom protections not afforded adults. The
guilty defendant may hope to capitalize on the inherent weaknesses of
childhood and use the system and his presence at trial to intimidate the
child-witness into silence or anxiety-produced confusion.26 7 If the child
accuses an innocent adult of sexual assault, an intimidated child may
distort the truth, tell more lies, and feel unable to recant the accusations
already made. A less intimidating atmosphere would encourage the
child to reveal the truth.2 68 Public policy warrants modifying the trial
proceeding for children to prevent undue psychological trauma while tes-
tifying, and to encourage truthful testimony.
Psychologists have found that children may suffer from continued
fear, guilt, and anxiety if forced to testify in court.26 9 Possible long-term
effects include: nightmares; depression; eating, sleeping, and school
problems; behavioral difficulties; and promiscuity.270 The psychiatric
goal in sexual-abuse cases should be to provide appropriate treatment of
the offender and strong support for the child. The prospect of reaching
this goal, in certain circumstances, may be severely inhibited by face-to-
face testimony.
As in Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie271 recognized the need to accommodate children in the court-
room. The Court determined that the defendant's sixth amendment
right to discover favorable evidence must yield to the state's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child-
abuse cases.272 In Ritchie, the defendant served the Children and Youth
265. See, e.g., Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525, 43 P. 641 (1896). The Roth court
held that a child should not be held to the same degree of care in avoiding danger as a person
of mature years and accumulated experience. Id. at 531, 43 P. at 647. Rather, the court held
children to the degree of discretion reasonably expected of children of that age. Id.
266. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the Supreme Court held that child por-
nography is a category of material outside first amendment protection. Id. at 752. The Court
held that the legislature could prohibit advertising and selling of child pornography in order to
advance the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of children. Id.
267. Mahady-Smith, supra note 7, at 743.
268. See Wolfe, Sas & Wilson, Some Issues in Preparing Sexually Abused Children for
Courtroom Testimony, 10 BEHAV. THERAPIST 107, 110 (1987).
269. Id. at 109-10.
270. Id. at 109.
271. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
272. Id. at 43.
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Services Agency27 3 with a subpoena seeking access to records to defend
a sexual molestation accusation.274 The agency refused, claiming that
the records were confidential under a Pennsylvania statute protecting the
work completed in child-abuse investigations.275 The Court held that an
in camera review by the trial court would protect the defendant's right to
discover favorable information contained in investigative files 276 and
would serve the defendant's interest in a fair trial.277
Ritchie held that the Confrontation Clause does not require pretrial
disclosure of any information that might be useful to contradict unfavor-
able testimony.278 Under Ritchie, a defendant has no constitutional right
to an unsupervised search through the state's files to determine the mate-
riality of information; rather, the state can regulate the manner of disclo-
sure to protect the child-witness' privacy rights.27 9 The defendant may
request specific information in the file he believes is material, and the
state must release information that becomes material during the proceed-
ings.280 However, the Court found that allowing full disclosure to the
defendant would unnecessarily sacrifice the state's compelling interest in
protecting its child-abuse information, and adversely affect the state's ef-
forts to discover and treat child abuse.281
Similarly, trial courts should be allowed to apply protective proce-
dures to serve the compelling public interest of protecting child-victims
of sexual abuse from undue psychological trauma while testifying. Legis-
latures in many states have enacted statutes designed to reduce the dan-
ger of emotional trauma to child-witnesses caused by testifying in
court.282 Indeed, California has enacted various provisions to lessen the
potentially traumatizing effect of a child's trial court experience.283 Such
273. The Children and Youth Services discussed in Ritchie was a protective service agency
that investigated alleged child abuse. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214 (Purdon Supp. 1986)).
276. Id. at 49.
277. Id. at 50.
278. Id. at 47. The Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not protect pretrial
discovery by a defendant in a criminal case; the Confrontation Clause only protects a defend-
ant's trial rights. Id. at 47 n.9.
279. Id. at 49.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 14.
283. California Penal Code section 1347(b) reads in part:
[T]he court in any criminal proceeding may order that the testimony of a minor 10
years of age or younger ... be taken by contemporaneous examination and cross-
examination in another place and out of the presence of the judge, jury, defendant,
and attorneys, and communicated to the courtroom ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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trial methods include screening devices, one-way or two-way closed cir-
cuit television broadcast into the courtroom from another location, and
videotaped testimony.284 These statutes let the child-victim testify in a
way intended to minimize the risk of trauma. Although the statutes per-
mit a deviation from normal trial procedure, the departure is minimal, at
most restricting, but not eliminating face-to-face confrontation. 285 The
limitation on the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation is min-
imal because most state statutes require that other procedural and con-
frontational trial safeguards, including cross-examination and the jury's
unobstructed view of the witness, remain unimpaired.286
VI. PROPOSAL: COURTS SHOULD LIMIT A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION IF NECESSARY TO PROTECT A CHILD-
WITNESS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM
As the United States Supreme Court has found reasons to limit even
the most fundamental constitutional rights,287 so must the Court limit
the defendant's sixth amendment right when overriding competing inter-
ests so warrant. The Court should balance the defendant's right to face-
to-face confrontation when necessary to serve the vital state interests of
protecting the mental health of testifying child-sexual assault victims and
of convicting child molesters. Indeed, without such balancing, the child
may refuse to testify, or testify inaccurately, thus frustrating the state's
interest in prosecuting child molestation cases. However, before the trial
court elects to limit the defendant's confrontation right, the court should
make a particularized finding of necessity to protect the child. A child
284. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp.1989) (two-way closed circuit televi-
sion); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1987) (hearsay exception for child's out of court state-
ment); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Bums Supp. 1988) (videotaped statement); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (1988) (hearsay exception); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1988) (hear-
say exception); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987) (hearsay exception); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988) (hearsay exception).
285. Use of a two-way television monitor enables the child and defendant to see each other,
though the child testifies from a different room in a less intimidating atmosphere surrounded
by her parents or psychologist. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1989). In other jurisdictions, a court
allows a videotaped deposition recorded in the presence of the defendant at an earlier time and
have it broadcast into the courtroom. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251-53 (Supp.
1988); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(1)
(Supp. 1988). Other state statutes call for one-way closed circuit television with the defendant
in the same room as the witness. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1987); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-8-55 (Harrison Supp. 1987).
286. See supra notes 14, 102, 113, 284 and 285 for a list of relevant state statutes.
287. The Court, for example, will limit an individual's first amendment right when a com-
pelling state interest exists. Globe Newspaper Co. v. County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
See also supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
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who testifies against the defendant has an interest in preserving his per-
sonal dignity, and in testifying without suffering undue severe psycholog-
ical harm.
Recently, a state supreme court held that in light of its interpreta-
tion of Coy v. Iowa, and the "virtual unanimity of other courts" in up-
holding the constitutionality of protective trial procedures, a valid
exception to the Confrontation Clause does exist: specifically, measures
necessary to protect a testifying child-victim from psychological harm.288
The court held that Justice Scalia did not preclude exceptions to the Con-
frontation Clause in his plurality opinion in Coy.289 The court further
stated, that invocation of any exceptions require a finding of necessity.
Therefore, once the trial court finds that the child cannot testify free
from emotional distress, the trial court may invoke the trial procedure;
however, "appropriate protective measures must then be tailored to limit
the confrontation right as little as feasible."'29
By slightly limiting the defendant's sixth amendment rights, both
the child's and the defendant's interests can be served. The Court would
restrict face-to-face confrontation between the defendant and the child in
favor of the goal of promoting truthful and accurate testimony by the
child.291 The defendant would still be entitled to all other sixth amend-
ment guarantees.292 In light of the compelling public interest in protect-
ing child-witnesses from undue psychological trauma and of prosecuting
child sexual abuse cases, slightly modifying the defendant's confrontation
right best serves the purposes of the sixth amendment-a fair trial for all
involved.
Finally, improving techniques used to investigate child-abuse cases
so that children are less traumatized during the early stages of the case,
may reduce the need to tamper with the defendant's confrontation right
at all. With early psychological counseling, the child should be able to
face the defendant at trial. Multiple interviews by insensitive and un-
trained police do at least as much damage to the children as a court
288. Craig v. Maryland, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See supra note 263 and accompanying text for discussion of how psychological stress
leads child-witnesses to either testify inaccurately, or refuse to testify at all.
292. Such guarantees include: the right to be represented by counsel, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980); and the right to a public trial, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980). Protective procedures used by many states do not affect these rights. For
example, the screen used in Coy blocked the defendant from the witnesses' line of vision, but,
the procedure did not limit these other sixth amendment guarantees.
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appearance.293 Rather than improve the process at the expense of the
Constitution, legislators should first improve pre-trial procedures and in-
vestigative practices.2 94
VII. CONCLUSION
In Coy v. Iowa, as in most modem trials, many of the evils existing
at the time of Sir Walter Raleigh's trial no longer exist. No longer are
defendants convicted on evidence that the defendant has no opportunity
to test. Defendants are entitled to a public jury trial, the right to counsel,
and the right to cross-examine their accusers, effectively remedying the
courtroom practices that during Raleigh's times denied face-to-face con-
frontation. In light of these trial safeguards, restricting the defendant's
confrontation right to accommodate competing state interests does not
infringe the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court correctly decided Coy. No testimony or evi-
dence was presented that testifying in the defendant's presence would
traumatize or harm the children.29 Thus, the record remained silent of
any justification for infringement of the defendant's right to confront his
adverse witnesses. A legislative procedure should not be able to limit a
defendant's constitutional confrontation right without a specific finding
of necessity. Without specific evidence that the children would suffer
psychological injury if forced to face the defendant in court, the screen
used at defendant's trial violated his confrontation right by denying him
the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him at trial.
In light of the fact that the lower court failed to make a finding of
necessity, Coy proved to be a simple case for the Supreme Court, and in
reality, answered no new questions. Justice Scalia's job proved easy-
Coy did not present the difficult issue of exactly how to balance the inter-
ests of testifying child-victims of sexual abuse against a defendant's sixth
amendment right. Justice Scalia refused to consider the issue of balanc-
ing since the trial court made no finding of necessity. However, Justice
O'Connor correctly reached beyond the case at hand to determine how
to strike that balance. Indeed, Justice O'Connor noted that if the trial
court did make a specific finding of necessity, the Supreme Court has
already held that a defendant's confrontation rights may be balanced
293. See Berliner, supra note 9, at 170; MacFarlane, supra note 6, at 137; Libai, supra note
11, at 984.
294. See Berliner, supra note 9, at 172; Mlyniec & Dally, supra note 246, at 134; Wolfe, Sas
& Wilson, supra note 268, at 109.
295. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988).
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against other competing state interests. 296 Justice O'Connor would per-
mit a trial procedure that prevented face-to-face confrontation if "neces-
sary to further an important public policy.
'297
Olivia W. Weinstein*
296. Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973)). In Coy, the plurality did not overrule Chambers on this point. Justice O'Connor
expressly rejected any suggestion by the plurality that the core confrontation right may not be
limited by competing interests in certain situations. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
* Thanks to Professor May for his editorial comments; to my parents for their support;
and to Lou for everything.
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